Islão - Tópico principal

[Lark]

a diferença de um republicano para um democrata no que toca aos sauditas: holding hands &  french kissing / bowing

L

[Lark]

wahhabismo e salafismo não são exactamente a mesma coisa:

Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism

The phenomenon of Islamic terrorism cannot be adequately explained as the export of Saudi Wahhabism, as many commentators claim. In fact, the ideological heritage of groups such as al-Qaeda is Salafism, a movement that began in Egypt and was imported into Saudi society during the reign of King Faisal.

The official ‘Wahhabi’ religion of Saudi Arabia has essentially merged with certain segments of Salafism. There is now intense competition between groups and individual scholars over the 'true' Salafism, with the scholars who support the Saudi regime attacking groups such as al-Qaeda as ‘Qutbists’ (following Sayyid Qutb) or takfiris (excommunicators).

 
The easy explanation for differences within the Salafi movement is that some aim to change society through da’wa (preaching/evangelizing) whereas others want to change it through violence. But as the Saudi example shows, all strains of Salafism, even the most revolutionary and violent, make a place for social services such as education in their strategies for the transformation of society.


Origins of Wahhabism

When Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab began preaching his revivalist brand of Islam amongst the Bedouins of the Najd [1] during the 18th century, his ideas were dismissed in the centers of Islamic learning such as al-Azhar as simplistic and erroneous to the point of heresy.


Ibn Abd al-Wahhab claimed that the decline of the Muslim world was caused by pernicious foreign innovations (bida’) - including European modernism, but also elements of traditional Islam that were simply unfamiliar to the isolated Najdi Bedouins. He counseled the purging of these influences in an Islamic Revival. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s creed placed an overriding emphasis on tawhid (monotheism), condemning many traditional Muslim practices as shirk (polytheism). He also gave jihad an unusual prominence in his teachings. The Wahhabis called themselves Muwahideen (monotheists) - to call themselves Wahhabis was considered shirk.


Origins of Salafism

Salafism originated in the mid to late 19th Century, as an intellectual movement at al-Azhar University, led by Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). The movement was built on a broad foundation. Al-Afghani was a political activist, whereas Abduh, an educator, sought gradual social reform (as a part of da’wa), particularly through education. Debate over the place of these respective methods of political change continues to this day in Salafi groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

The early Salafis admired the technological and social advancement of Europe’s Enlightenment, and tried to reconcile it with the belief that their own society was the heir to a divinely guided Golden Age of Islam that had followed the Prophet Muhammad’s Revelations.

The name Salafi comes from as-salaf as-saliheen, the ‘pious predecessors’ of the early Muslim community, although some Salafis extend the Salaf to include selected later scholars. The Salafis held that the early Muslims had understood and practiced Islam correctly, but true understanding of Islam had gradually drifted, just as the people of previous Prophets (including Moses and Jesus) had strayed and gone into decline. The Salafis set out to rationally reinterpret early Islam with the expectation of rediscovering a more ‘modern’ religion.

In terms of their respective formation, Wahhabism and Salafism were quite distinct. Wahhabism was a pared-down Islam that rejected modern influences, while Salafism sought to reconcile Islam with modernism. What they had in common is that both rejected traditional teachings on Islam in favor of direct, ‘fundamentalist’ reinterpretation.
 
Saudi Arabia Embraces Salafi Pan-Islamism

Although Saudi Arabia is commonly characterized as aggressively exporting Wahhabism, it has in fact imported pan-Islamic Salafism. Saudi Arabia founded and funded transnational organizations and headquartered them in the kingdom, but many of the guiding figures in these bodies were foreign Salafis. The most well known of these organizations was the World Muslim League, founded in Mecca in 1962, which distributed books and cassettes by al-Banna, Qutb and other foreign Salafi luminaries. Saudi Arabia successfully courted academics at al-Azhar University, and invited radical Salafis to teach at its own Universities.

Saudi Arabia’s decision to host Egyptian radicals hinges on three factors: the need for qualified educators, Faisal’s struggle against Egyptian-led pan-Arab radicalism, and Saudi openness under King Khaled. Between the 1920s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia was emerging as a modern state. Increased oil production required technical infrastructure and a bureaucracy, resulting in a demand for educators that outstripped the administration’s capacity. [2] The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood represented a source of qualified educators, bureaucrats and engineers, many of them anxious to leave Egypt.

During the late 1950s and the 1960s, the Middle East was gripped by a struggle between the traditional monarchies and the secular pan-Arab radicals, led by Nasser’s Egypt, with the pan-Islamist Salafis an important third force. [3] By embracing pan-Islamism, Faisal countered the idea of pan-Arab loyalty centered on Egypt with a larger transnational loyalty centered on Saudi Arabia. During the 1960s, members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, many of them teachers, were given sanctuary in Saudi Arabia, in a move that undermined Nasser while also relieving the Saudi education crisis. [4]

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy concerns eased in 1970 with Nasser’s death. But in the 1970s, the Saudi education system was awash with Egyptian Muslim Brothers and other Salafis, much as Berkeley was awash with Marxists. Under King Khaled (r.1975-1982), some of the most important proponents of Qutbist terrorism, including Abdullah Azzam, Omar Abd al-Rahman and Muhammad Qutb, served as academics in the Kingdom. Qutb, an important proponent of his late brother Sayyid’s theory, wrote several texts on tawhid for the Saudi school curriculum. [5]

A generation of prominent Saudi citizens was exposed to various strains of Salafi thought during the 1970s, and although most Saudi Salafis are not Qutbist revolutionaries, the Qutbists did not miss the opportunity to awaken a revolutionary vanguard.

Wahhabi-Salafism

Although Salafism and Wahhabism began as two distinct movements, Faisal's embrace of Salafi pan-Islamism resulted in cross-pollination between ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings on tawhid, shirk and bid’a and Salafi interpretations of ahadith (the sayings of Muhammad). Some Salafis nominated ibn Abd al-Wahhab as one of the Salaf (retrospectively bringing Wahhabism into the fold of Salafism), and the Muwahideen began calling themselves Salafis.

Today, a profusion of self-proclaimed Salafi groups exist, each accusing the others of deviating from 'true' Salafism. Since the 1970s, the Saudis have wisely stopped funding those Salafis that excommunicate nominally Muslim governments (or at least the Saudi government), condemning al-Qaeda as ‘the deviant sect’. The pro-Saudis correctly trace al-Qaeda’s ideological roots to Qutb and al-Banna.

Less accurately, they accuse these groups of insidiously 'entering' Salafism. In fact, Salafism was imported into Saudi Arabia in its Ikhwani and Qutbist forms. This does not mean that the pro-Saudi Salafis are necessarily benign - for example, Abu Mu'aadh as-Salafee’s main criticism of Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna is that they claim Islam teaches tolerance of Jews.[6]


Meanwhile, non-Muslims and mainstream Muslims alike use the ‘Wahhabi-Salafi’ label to denigrate Salafis and even completely unrelated groups such as the Taliban.

Conclusions

Faisal’s embrace of pan-Islamism achieved its main objective in that it helped Saudi Arabia to overcome pan-Arabism. However, it created a radicalized Salafi constituency, elements of which the regime continues to fund. It should be kept in mind, though, that this funding is now confined to more compliant Salafis.

Saudi Arabia still has some way to go. Some will say that a leopard can’t change its spots, but in fact the Saudi Government is capable of serious doctrinal change under pressure. Faisal’s broad introduction of Salafi policies involved such a shift, as did the subsequent rejection of Qutbist interpretations of Salafism by pro-Saudi Salafis.

The Middle East today is clearly in need of alternative models of political change to counter takfiri Salafism. In the West, education has been a major factor in social integration. But as the Saudi case study indicates, we need to be aware of not only the quantity, but also the nature of education. Saudi students in the 1970s learned engineering and administration alongside an ideology of xenophobic alienation. In the long run, the battle against violent Salafism will be fought not only on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in the universities of the Middle East.

fonte

[Counter Retail Trader]

A Turquia tambem podia ser aliada ao Egipto etc para escorraçar , mas tenho as minhas duvidas que o faça..

[Incognitus]

a diferença de um republicano para um democrata no que toca aos sauditas: holding hands &  french kissing / bowing

L

Queres dizer que os Democratas são mais homofóbicos? Tanto por não cumprirem os costumes locais como por darem ênfase (tu) a isso? 

[Counter Retail Trader]

A foto do xoxo parece fake    , apesar de o bush ser maluco para isso e muito mais

[Lark]

a diferença de um republicano para um democrata no que toca aos sauditas: holding hands &  french kissing / bowing

L

Queres dizer que os Democratas são mais homofóbicos? Tanto por não cumprirem os costumes locais como por darem ênfase (tu) a isso? 

não quero dizer nada. só estou a expôr.
tu, o que é que queres dizer com o que disseste?
já agora de tudo o que postei, foi isto que te chamou a atenção?

L

[Zel]

prefiro beijinhos a venias, eh mais igualitario 

[Incognitus]

a diferença de um republicano para um democrata no que toca aos sauditas: holding hands &  french kissing / bowing

L

Queres dizer que os Democratas são mais homofóbicos? Tanto por não cumprirem os costumes locais como por darem ênfase (tu) a isso? 

não quero dizer nada. só estou a expôr.
tu, o que é que queres dizer com o que disseste?
já agora de tudo o que postei, foi isto que te chamou a atenção?

L

Eu só vi isto. Estás a expor como é que um Republicano cumprimentou o Sheik, e como é que o Obama o fez. Claramente, para "tirar sarro" do Bush ter (se calhar, se não for fake) dado um xoxo no Sheik.

Claramente há aí um explorar da homofobia, pois só fará diferença se deu um xoxo ou não, a quem seja pelo menos um pouco homofóbico. Igualmente, só não dá o xoxo o Presidente que acha que aquilo, em vez de um costume, é uma cena meio homossexual. Só isso.

Se não fosse assim, para que é que terias colocado esta coisa descabida, notando claramente que um era Republicano e o outro, Democrata?

Rir ... 

------

E o engraçado, é que se for fake continuas a ter essa atitude estranha, e ainda há a adicionar que um Democrata qualquer tinha a mesma ideia (também era homofóbico e também achava aquilo meio homossexual), além de cometer o acto pouco ético de fazer a coisa falsa. Que tu, depois, reproduziste -- pouco te importando se era falsa ou não pois ia ao encontro da tua tentativa de denegrir um Republicano com uma cena supostamente homossexual.

São tantas as falhas éticas e fóbicas que até mete confusão. E mais engraçado ainda, aqui não vêsz problema na homofobia (sendo que os homossexuais nâo fazem mal a ninguém), e já com a Islamofobia (que é estatisticamente justificada) já vês problema.

Num só post é muito sumo, Lark.

[Lark]

é... o french kissing é fake. é só beijocas na face e dar as mãos.

!

isto era para ilustrar como é os sauditas se safam com as atrocidades todas que cometem.
os americanos dão-lhes a mão e fazem-lhes vénias.

era essa a mensagem.

porque é que estás tão agreste hoje?
colocar este conteúdo todo dá trabalho...
espreita lá as páginas anteriores

L

EDIT: qual sheik? é o falecido rei abdulah...

[Lark]

Saudi Arabia is unknown to many. Hardly any news coming from Ryad makes global headlines. But regardless of this aura of mystery and silence, some of the most important social and religious issues of the Arab world are at stake within its borders.

The first issue, probably the most important one, is Wahabism, the State religion in Saudi Arabia. As many already know, Islam - if compared to Catholicism for instance - does not have a prevailing clerical structure guiding followers through the interpretation of the sacred books. This circumstance has allowed different people and competing schools of thought the possibility of interpreting, in the most diverse ways and with the most varying consequences, the words of the Koran and of Prophet Mohamed. It was on these basis that, besides from the division between Sunnis and Shiites, the different currents of Islam were born: the Sufi moderates on one side, the radical Salafists on the other.

The origins of Salafism and Wahabism

Salafism preaches a return to pure Islam, as it was in the days following the death of the Prophet, in the belief that foreign occupations and collusions with the Western world had pushed religion away from its original characteristics. Its main dogma is on the uniqueness of God ("tawhid"). It was on this basis that, over the course of time, the worshipping of saints and religious leaders was fought.

The war against the deviations from the right path, that has also taken an iconoclastic form (like recently against the tombs of Sufi saints in Timbuktu in Mali), is central to Salafi doctrine. Salafism begins with the religious theories of Ibn Taymiyah and then, later in time, with those of Mohammed Ibn Abel Wahab.

A Syrian, Ibn Taymiyah was a jurist and a theologian who lived in the 15th century and was a disciple of the Hanbalist school (founded by Ahmad Ibn Hanbali in the 9th century). His theory was that the sacred books of the Koran and the Sunna could and should have been individually interpreted (in what is known as "itjihad"). This theological approach, by extending to virtually anybody the possibility of attributing meanings and interpreting the sacred books of Islam, paved the way to what later will become the exploitation of religion for subversive goals.

In the 18th century, Mohammed Ibn Abdel Wahab (1703-1792, the founder of Wahabism) also joined Hanbalism to return to pure Islam. The latest relevant Salafist movement was the one founded by Hassan al Banna in 1928: the association of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian cleric added a new element to the formula used by his predecessors: the use of Islam as a political tool to guide the masses.

In the 50s another Egyptian and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyed Qutb (1906-1966), theorized that political Salafism take up arms against impious Arabic leaders to return to an Islamic State. Qutb has become the ideological reference for several terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda. He was put to death for his extremism by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1966.

Salafist movements follow a strict interpretation of the Koran and of the Sunna, they oppose all those traditions and customs that - in their eyes - have nothing to do with Prophet Mohamed's teachings and, above all, they stress the need for the uniqueness of God, absolute monotheism ("al ahwad"). This is one of the reasons why Salafi movements are often referred to with the appellation of "mowahiddun", the unitary.

What is the most interesting is that this approach to Islam has taken different meanings and forms over time: it has been irredentism, Arab nationalism, fight against Western consumerism and lax habits, until becoming jihad and islamic terrorism.

The negative evolution of Salafism has transformed what had begun as a reformist and modernist approach to religion (that freed the interpretation of the sacred books from the clergy) into a radical and fundamentalist approach. Today its main representatives, besides from the numerous organizations that spring out on the Middle Eastern landscape, are both the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahabism. If we were to trace a line in the struggle between the reformist and modernist souls of Islam and the fundamentalists, the latter would bring it home.

Wahab's Salafism historically served the purpose, especially during colonialism, of confronting and contrasting Western habits and culture. But it then turned against all those other Sunni movements that were not as dogmatic and rigid in applying the precepts of Islam. In the present day as in the past, the first to be targeted were Sufi confraternities and their moderate approach to religion. There was then yet another evolution in the doctrine: Salafism became the element justifying subversion (against apostates and impious rulers) and, as a consequence, terrorism. It was in the name of this radical stance on Islam that killings, attacks, coups, destructions and vendettas through fatwas and edicts were carried out.

Saudi Arabia and Wahabism

Although initially Wahabism was more of a movement of public opinion and a religious doctrine, its collusion with the secular power of Mohamed al Saud and the successive development of the Saudi monarchy in Saudi Arabia have submitted religious precepts to political goals and vice-versa. It is emblematic that in Saudi Arabia the oath of loyalty to the leader ("al bayah") follows a religious scheme dear to Wahabism. And since Islam is also a faith with a strong social impact, likewise has been Wahabism's role in forging both Saudi society and, thanks to the revenues granted by oil, a good portion of Sunni muslim Arab world.

As already stated, Wahabism has developed along Salafi beliefs and preaches a return to primordial Islam; traditions and customs as they were supposed to be before being infected by time. A purism that has turned into radicalism and has then been exported thanks to the strength of the petrodollars. Followers of Wahabism refuse being labelled as "wahabis", but only as "muslims" in the belief of being the unique bearers of Islamic doctrine. The most dangerous aspect of Wahabism is it fueling a religious culture of intolerance and it waging a borderless endogenous war against other muslim "infidels" and basically on anyone who is not a Salafist (the worshipping of saints and pious men is considered along the same lines as polytheism).

On the external and exogenous front, Wahabism fights non-believers, like Christians and Jews. A war against the infidels ("kufr" in Arabic) is theologically justified by what wahabists consider the sole true and inescapable right path of Islam. In their view, there is no room offered to the unification of the different Islamic schools of thought ("madhahib"). Anyone not following the "true" teachings of Islam (as identified by Wahabism of course) is a "jahili", an infidel.

Wahabism's iconoclastic fury lead the followers of Al Wahab to destroy all muslim burial sites they encountered when conquering new territories. The same happened to the tomb and worshipping site of Prophet Mohamed when al Wahab conquered Mecca and Medina. Until now, the devout of Wahab refuse being buried in tombs, they forbid all celebrations for the birth of Prophet Mohamed and any other Islamic feast. God is unique and every form of devotion should be addressed at him only.

The end result is a world frozen in the past, with no space for the evolution of society and its habits. Wahabism has prevented from the start any chance of going along a path leading to a modernization of intentions and of ideas. Until today in Saudi Arabia apostasy is punished with death, the cult of other religions and the displaying of their symbols is forbidden and persecuted by the Saudi reign. Religious crimes can even be punished with crucifixion.

Wahabism also imposes precise behavioral norms: those common to all muslims (no alcohol or pork meat), plus more specific ones (no exhibition of wealth and jewels, no silk, beard no shorter than a designated length and the hair no longer than another). The strictest rules are for women who have to dress with dark cloths covering them from head to toes. It is the application of a somewhat medieval Wahabism that forbids women from driving a car, going to study abroad, traveling unaccompanied, taking certain jobs and being admitted to hospital without the tutorial consent of a husband or a relative. In Saudi Arabia women are to all effects second class citizens.

All of this inevitably leads to the internal diatribe between the Wahabi clergy and its unswerving radical vision of society and a good portion of Saudi public opinion that demands the emancipation of the country. King Abdallah has introduced limited concessions to improve the condition of women: the right to vote in local elections from 2015, their membership in the Consultative Council ("Shura") with a minimum 20% of representation (30 out of 150 members in a hardly relevant organism.

Women will access the premises from a separate entrance, will seat in a separate part of the assembly and will have to wear the hijab), the right to become lawyers, participate in the olympics and be part of the General Intelligence Department. All of these initiatives have been met with protests and reluctance by the clergy, hostile to any emancipation of women.

The doctrine of terrorism

Such closed society system and its annexed religious vision that accepts no compromises or concessions are taught from an early age to the youth through a network of islamic schools ("madrasse"). There is currently a strong competition in the Salafist field between wahabis and the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a competition played over ideological and theological extremisms, the politics of religion and the influence over Arab societies. This circumstance provides wide space for religious extremism that then turns into terrorism and holy war against the impious and the infidels.

Among the muslim and Arab countries, Saudi Arabia is the only country where Salafism in its wahabi interpretation has become the dogmatic inspiration of the State. The financial strength of the Saudis grants Salafism and Wahabism the possibility of expanding their doctrine to other muslim countries. And if one were to look for a common ideological denominator for global islamic terrorism and jihab this would be Wahabism. Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, the Somali al Shabaab, the irredentist movements in northern Mali, the Nigerian Boko Haram, the talebans in Afghanistan all share this common doctrinal approach.

fonte

[Lark]

um dos grandes problemas, nesta questão é a hipocrisia ocidental.
não é preciso trabalhar nos serviços secretos para se saber que o terrorismo sunita é financiado pela Arábia Saudita.
Não é preciso ser perito em islamismo para se saber que a conexão entre a al-qaeda, talibans afegãos e paquistaneses é o dinheiro saudita, sendo a ISIS apenas a mais recente instância.
No entanto o ocidente acarinha e protege as monarquias islamo-fascistas.
Enquanto isto não mudar não estou a ver grande solução para o problema do terrorismo wahhabita.

E mudar implica fazer saltar fora essas mesmas monarquias - A. Saudita, Koweit, Omã, Qatar e Barém.

L

[Lark]

pode ser que a circumnavegação diplomática à A.Saudita já tenha começado.
talvez o próximo presidente americano não tenha que se curvar perante o rei saudita.

Shifting Direction, Kerry Aims to Include Iran in Efforts to End the Conflict in Syria

UNITED NATIONS — Secretary of State John Kerry sought on Saturday to draw Iran into the search for a political solution to the Syrian conflict as he began a week of diplomacy over the brutal fighting there.

“I view this week as a major opportunity for any number of countries to play an important role,” Mr. Kerry said at the start of a meeting at the United Nations headquarters with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister. “We need to achieve peace and a way forward in Syria, in Yemen, in the region itself.”

In early 2014, the Obama administration blocked Iran from attending a peace conference on Syria, on the grounds that its paramilitary Quds Force was a belligerent in the conflict and that Iranian officials did not accept that the goal of the talks should be the formation of a transitional Syrian administration with the “mutual consent” of the opposition and the government.

When Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations secretary general, invited Iran to attend the conference, which was held in Montreux, Switzerland, Mr. Kerry insisted that the invitation be rescinded.

“Iran is currently a major actor with respect to adverse consequences in Syria,” Mr. Kerry said then.

But with the Islamic State terrorist group making gains in Syria, a tidal wave of migrants swamping Europe, no formal peace talks in sight and Russia engaged in a military buildup at an air base near Latakia, on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, Mr. Kerry is now reaching out to Iran, which has been a major backer of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, to see if there is a basis for resuming negotiations. Mr. Kerry has also been consulting with Russia, European nations and Arab states.

Mr. Kerry’s meeting with Mr. Zarif was his first since six world powers and Iran reached a nuclear accord in July. While American officials discussed Syria with the Iranians on the margins of the nuclear talks, they saw the Saturday meeting as a chance for a fuller discussion.

Still, the conditions for a breakthrough on Syria are not auspicious. The Obama administration’s ability to shape a diplomatic outcome in Syria has been diminished by the Pentagon’s failure to train and equip more than a handful of moderate Syrian rebels to confront the Islamic State.

At the same time, Russia has expanded its influence with its military buildup at a base near Latakia. Mr. Kerry said this month in London that Mr. Assad had shown no interest in negotiating a political transition in which he would eventually step down and that Russia had done nothing to bring him to the table. Iran has long had a strategic interest in maintaining Mr. Assad in power because the airport in Damascus, the Syrian capital, serves as a channel for shipping Iranian weapons to Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militia. Iran pressed Hezbollah to join the fighting in Syria on the side of Mr. Assad, provided weapons to the Syrian government and sent its own Quds Force personnel there.

Wendy R. Sherman, the under secretary of state for political affairs, told reporters on Friday that it was unclear whether Iran was interested in working with the United States to negotiate a political transition in Syria.

“There are very strong political sensitivities, differences within Iran about whether there should be discussions with the United States,” she said when asked about Syria diplomacy. “I think there are serious limitations to what Foreign Minister Zarif can do in any formal sense right now. So, as I said, there will probably be some listening as well as some talking.”

In brief remarks at the start of the meeting on Saturday with Mr. Kerry, Mr. Zarif said his main priority was to discuss carrying out the nuclear accord, making no effort to encourage the notion that Iran sees an opportunity to join forces with Washington in finding a solution in Syria.

“The situation in the region, the unfortunate developments in Saudi Arabia over the last week, have been disastrous, and we need to address them,” he said, referring to a stampede at the annual pilgrimage to Mecca that killed more than 700 people. “We will address them in the proper international forum.”

Mr. Kerry planned to continue his talks on Syria in a meeting on Saturday evening with Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister. On Sunday morning, Mr. Kerry is scheduled to meet with Sergey V. Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister.

nyt

[Incognitus]

um dos grandes problemas, nesta questão é a hipocrisia ocidental.
não é preciso trabalhar nos serviços secretos para se saber que o terrorismo sunita é financiado pela Arábia Saudita.
Não é preciso ser perito em islamismo para se saber que a conexão entre a al-qaeda, talibans afegãos e paquistaneses é o dinheiro saudita, sendo a ISIS apenas a mais recente instância.
No entanto o ocidente acarinha e protege as monarquias islamo-fascistas.
Enquanto isto não mudar não estou a ver grande solução para o problema do terrorismo wahhabita.

E mudar implica fazer saltar fora essas mesmas monarquias - A. Saudita, Koweit, Omã, Qatar e Barém.

L

O terrorismo é um problema menor ... aparece muito nas notícias, mas a relevância para a pessoa comum é muito pequena, versus a grande relevância para um Francês(a) ou Sueco(a) de uma grande população muçulmana.

[Zel]

um dos grandes problemas, nesta questão é a hipocrisia ocidental.
não é preciso trabalhar nos serviços secretos para se saber que o terrorismo sunita é financiado pela Arábia Saudita.
Não é preciso ser perito em islamismo para se saber que a conexão entre a al-qaeda, talibans afegãos e paquistaneses é o dinheiro saudita, sendo a ISIS apenas a mais recente instância.
No entanto o ocidente acarinha e protege as monarquias islamo-fascistas.
Enquanto isto não mudar não estou a ver grande solução para o problema do terrorismo wahhabita.

E mudar implica fazer saltar fora essas mesmas monarquias - A. Saudita, Koweit, Omã, Qatar e Barém.

L

mas muito desse dinheiro sai do controlo governamental, o ISIS nao eh pro familia real saudita
a coisa eh complicada pois os gajos dependem em parte do clero saudita para se legitimarem como governantes, o poder eh limitado. ate para meterem televisao no pais precisaram de autorizacao do clero (fatua)
ja com os talibans, foi o governo saudita mas com apoio americano, para ajudar contra os russos. mais um erro gigante americano que ninguem quer relembrar

[Lark]

um dos grandes problemas, nesta questão é a hipocrisia ocidental.
não é preciso trabalhar nos serviços secretos para se saber que o terrorismo sunita é financiado pela Arábia Saudita.
Não é preciso ser perito em islamismo para se saber que a conexão entre a al-qaeda, talibans afegãos e paquistaneses é o dinheiro saudita, sendo a ISIS apenas a mais recente instância.
No entanto o ocidente acarinha e protege as monarquias islamo-fascistas.
Enquanto isto não mudar não estou a ver grande solução para o problema do terrorismo wahhabita.

E mudar implica fazer saltar fora essas mesmas monarquias - A. Saudita, Koweit, Omã, Qatar e Barém.

L

O terrorismo é um problema menor ... aparece muito nas notícias, mas a relevância para a pessoa comum é muito pequena, versus a grande relevância para um Francês(a) ou Sueco(a) de uma grande população muçulmana.

o terrorismo é um problema menor? para os sírios não é. é o seu maior problema.
para os americanos também não foi pequeno, nem para os ingleses e espanhois. e há pouco os franceses. todos foram atacados forte e feio.

para os iraquianos e para os sírios é o dia a dia.

L

[Incognitus]

Não é um problema grande do ponto de vista do Ocidente.

No Médio Oriente é mais uma forma de vida, constante e relevante. Nota também que na Síria aquilo é uma guerra civil, não é bem terrorismo. Terrorismo suficiente passa a guerra.

[Lark]

Terrorismo suficiente passa a guerra.

é um ponto de vista interessante: as guerras não são mais que terrorismo de alta intensidade.

L

[Counter Retail Trader]

Relativamente á foto so pode ser Fake , o Bush nem aos filhos e netos deve ter dado beijos assim... contudo acredito que nos seus tempos loucos tenha experimentado alternativas sem estar consciente dos seus actos...

A questao do que é guerra e o que é terrorismo ...nunca pensei nessa questao , mas parece me que o   terrorismo é uma ferramenta da guerra... uma ação ou um conjunto de açoes pre meditadas que visam a prejudicar uma contraparte pre definida como alvo ... ouj melhor um factor que fazer parte da estrategia.

[Lark]

How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism
Yousaf Butt  Nuclear Physicist, Senior Advisor to the British American Security Information Council

Dr. Yousaf Butt is a senior advisor to the British American Security Information Council and director at the Cultural Intelligence Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

LONDON -- The horrific terrorist attacks on the Charlie Hebdo weekly in Paris have led to speculation as to whether the killers -- the brothers Chérif and Saïd Kouachi -- were lone wolves or tied to masterminds in ISIS or its rival, Al-Qaeda. Although Al-Qaeda in Yemen has taken credit for the attack, it is unclear how closely the affiliate actually directed the operation. No matter which organizational connections (if any) ultimately prove to be real, one thing is clear: the fountainhead of Islamic extremism that promotes and legitimizes such violence lies with the fanatical "Wahhabi" strain of Islam centered in Saudi Arabia. And if the world wants to tamp down and eliminate such violent extremism, it must confront this primary host and facilitator.

Perversely, while the Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Awad Asiri took part in a "Je suis Charlie" solidarity rally in Beirut following the Paris attacks, back home the Saudi blogger Raif Badawi received the first 50 of 1,000 lashes he is due each Friday over the next 20 weeks. His crime? Running a liberal website promoting the freedom of speech. (Thankfully, in recent days it seems the Saudi authorities have buckled to international pressure and suspended the sentence.)

It would be troublesome but perhaps acceptable for the House of Saud to promote the intolerant and extremist Wahhabi creed just domestically. But, unfortunately, for decades the Saudis have also lavishly financed its propagation abroad. Exact numbers are not known, but it is thought that more than $100 billion have been spent on exporting fanatical Wahhabism to various much poorer Muslim nations worldwide over the past three decades. It might well be twice that number. By comparison, the Soviets spent about $7 billion spreading communism worldwide in the 70 years from 1921 and 1991.

This appears to be a monumental campaign to bulldoze the more moderate strains of Islam, and replace them with the theo-fascist Saudi variety. Despite being well aware of the issue, Western powers continue to coddle the Saudis or, at most, protest meekly from time to time.

For instance, a Wikileaks cable clearly quotes then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton saying "donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide." She continues: "More needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups." And it's not just the Saudis: Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are also implicated in the memo. Other cables released by Wikileaks outline how Saudi front companies are also used to fund terrorism abroad.

Evidently, the situation has not improved since Hillary Clinton was secretary of state. Late last year, Vice President Biden caused a stir by undiplomatically speaking the truth at an event at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, saying:

"Our allies in the region were our largest problem in Syria. The Turks were great friends... [and] the Saudis, the Emirates, etcetera. What were they doing?.... They poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad -- except that the people who were being supplied, [they] were al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda, and the extremist elements of jihadis who were coming from other parts of the world."

More recently, the Saudi role in promoting extremism has come under renewed scrutiny. Calls for declassifying the redacted 28 pages of the 9/11 congressional commission have been getting stronger. And statements from the lead author of the report, former Florida Sen. Bob Graham, suggest they are being hidden because they "point a very strong finger at Saudi Arabia as the principal financier" of the 9/11 hijackers. He has been unusually explicit, "Saudi Arabia has not stopped its interest in spreading extreme Wahhabism. ISIS...is a product of Saudi ideals, Saudi money and Saudi organizational support, although now they are making a pretense of being very anti-ISIS."

In fact, Saudi blogger Raif Badawi's wife, Ensaf Haidar, made a similar observation about her husband's flogging: "the Saudi government is behaving like Daesh [a derogatory Arabic term for ISIS]." About 2,500 Saudis are thought to be in ISIS' ranks.

Ensaf Haidar's quip exposes a deeper truth. One could reasonably argue that the House of Saud is simply a more established and diplomatic version of ISIS. It shares the extremist Wahhabi theo-fascism, the lack of human rights, intolerance, violent beheadings etc. -- but with nicer buildings and roads. If ISIS were ever to become an established state, after a few decades one imagines it might resemble Saudi Arabia.

How does Saudi Arabia go about spreading extremism? The extremist agenda is not always clearly government-sanctioned, but in monarchies where the government money is spread around to various princes, there is little accountability for what the royal family does with their government funds. Much of the funding is via charitable organizations and is not military-related.

The money goes to constructing and operating mosques and madrassas that preach radical Wahhabism. The money also goes to training imams; media outreach and publishing; distribution of Wahhabi textbooks, and endowments to universities and cultural centers. A cable released by Wikileaks explains, regarding just one region of Pakistan:

Government and non-governmental sources claimed that financial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from "missionary" and "Islamic charitable" organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governments.

Although the Wahhabi curriculum was modified after the 9/11 attacks, it remains backward and intolerant. Freedom House published a report on the revised curriculum, concluding that it "continues to propagate an ideology of hate toward the 'unbeliever,' which include Christians, Jews, Shiites, Sufis, Sunni Muslims who do not follow Wahhabi doctrine, Hindus, atheists and others." This is taught not only domestically but also enthusiastically exported abroad.

Of course, initially there was complicity with the U.S. and Pakistan in promoting this ideology to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In addition to the radical indoctrination, thousands of volunteer jihadis from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries were also dispatched to fight alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan. But it remains a complicated problem to this day because the politicians in the poor countries getting the Saudi and Gulf-Arab funds approve these extremist madrassas in part because the local authorities likely receive kickbacks.

In many places in poor Muslim countries the choice is now between going to an extremist madrassa or getting no education at all. Poverty is exploited to promote extremism. The affected areas include Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, India and parts of Africa. The same Wikileaks cable explains:

The network reportedly exploited worsening poverty in these areas of the province to recruit children into the divisions' growing Deobandi and Ahl-eHadith madrassa network from which they were indoctrinated into jihadi philosophy, deployed to regional training/indoctrination centers, and ultimately sent to terrorist training camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

The more tolerant indigenous versions of Islam cannot survive in the face of the tsunami of money being poured into promoting theo-fascist Wahhabism. This is a major problem that the Muslim world must urgently address.

But it is also a problem where the West can help by stopping its historical pandering and support of Middle East tyrants who spread this extremism. The most fundamental way to make the message clear to the House of Saud would be to threaten to stop buying oil from them. Given the relatively cheap oil prices these days it need not be an empty threat.

Eliminating the occasional militant leaders in drone and special-forces strikes is of limited use in reducing extremism if millions of radicals are being actively trained in Wahhabi madrassas across the Muslim world.

The fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda is deeply ironic since these organizations were created and are sustained, in part, by funds we hand over to the Saudis and Gulf Arab nations to purchase their oil. And while France mourns its cartoonists and police officers, the French government is busy signing military and nuclear deals worth billions with the Saudis. If we continue down this road, it may well be a never-ending war.

The House of Saud works against the best interests of the West and the Muslim world. Muslim communities worldwide certainly need to eradicate fanatical Wahhabism from their midst, but this will be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish if the West continues its support of the House of Saud. The monarchy must be modernized and modified -- or simply uprooted and replaced. The House of Saud needs a thorough house cleaning.

fonte

[Zel]

o problema eh que a familia real tb depende dos teocratas para se legitimar, o texto ignora o facto deles terem um imenso poder independente da familia real